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Abstract
We test the existence of a neighborhood based peer effect around participation in an incentive
based conservation program called ‘Water Smart Landscapes’ (WSL) in the city of Las Vegas, Nevada.
We use 15 years of geo-coded daily records of WSL program applications and approvals compiled by
the Southern Nevada Water Authority and Clark County Tax Assessors rolls for home character-
istics. We use this data to test whether a spatially mediated peer effect can be observed in WSL
participation likelihood at the household level. We show that epidemic spreading models provide
more flexibility in modeling assumptions, and also provide one mechanism for addressing problems
associated with correlated unobservables than hazards models which can also be applied to address
the same questions. We build networks of neighborhood based peers for 16 randomly selected neigh-
borhoods in Las Vegas and test for the existence of a peer based influence on WSL participation by
using a Susceptible-Exposed-Infected-Recovered epidemic spreading model (SEIR), in which a home
can become infected via autoinfection or through contagion from its infected neighbors. We show that
this type of epidemic model can be directly recast to an additive-multiplicative hazard model, but
not to purely multiplicative one. Using both inference and prediction approaches we find evidence of
peer effects in several Las Vegas neighborhoods.
∗This manuscript has been co-authored by UT-Battelle, LLC, under contract DE-AC05-00OR22725 with the US De-
partment of Energy (DOE). The US government retains and the publisher, by accepting the article for publication,
acknowledges that the US government retains a nonexclusive, paid-up, irrevocable, worldwide license to publish or re-
produce the published form of this manuscript, or allow others to do so, for US government purposes. DOE will
provide public access to these results of federally sponsored research in accordance with the DOE Public Access Plan
(http://energy.gov/downloads/doe-public-access-plan).
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1 Introduction
In the face of increasing climate variability and growing water demand associated with rising populations,
policymakers are faced with the harsh reality of water scarcity. Conservation measures targeting outdoor
landscaping have become popular because consumers often are unaware of their outdoor water use, sug-
gesting that substantial savings may be generated with even small incentives and changes in customer
awareness. “Cash for grass” style water conservation programs have become an important water conser-
vation strategy in the western US over the last two decades. The Southern Nevada Water Authority’s
(SNWA) Water Smart Landscapes program (WSL) pays homeowners to replace their lawns with xeric
(desert) landscapes, one of the longest running “cash for grass” programs. While the difference in wa-
tering requirements of mesic vs. xeric landscaping are well established, and short-run savings have been
demonstrated in a few cases a number of questions are unanswered about turf-removal subsidy programs
Brelsford and Abbott (2017).
WSL participation is highly visible to neighboring homes, and may trigger a mechanism of social
learning that can impact the neighbors’ adoption behavior. This stimulates a key research question:
can we observe neighborhood based peer effects in household participation in Las Vegas’ Water Smart
Landscapes program? Measuring the influence that an individual has on their peers is important for
estimating the indirect benefits a conservation policy may create, but distinguishing true peer effects
from homophily, correlated unobservables, and reflection is econometrically challenging. Modeling peer
influence on networks through epidemic modeling techniques may provide a useful tool for identifying
peer effects without the bias that these challenges can introduce. We analyze a very high resolution
dataset from the WSL program in Las Vegas, Nevada. This dataset includes both the day of application,
and the day of completion of all program requirements for each participating household in the Las Vegas
Valley Water District Service area. These data thus allow us to differentiate between the decision to
participate in WSL and its implementation.
The challenges to unbiased identification of peer effects are substantial in the absence of experimen-
tal data, and have been well described by Manski (1993, 2000); Brock and Durlauf (2001); Soetevent
(2006); Aral et al. (2009); Shalizi and Thomas (2011); Angrist (2014); Ryan (2017) and others. There
are three major challenges to the econometric identification of peer effects. First, reflection between two
participating homes or individuals with similar adoption times, makes it difficult to determine which par-
ticipant influenced the other. Second, homophily, where households that are predisposed to participate
in the WSL program self-select into the same neighborhoods. Finally, correlated unobservables may also
spuriously generate the appearance of peer effects, when in fact, there are spatially mediated unobserved
factors which differentially influence households to participate in WSL. For example, perhaps local envi-
ronmental conditions make grass particularly difficult to keep alive due to locally higher temperatures,
excessive wind, or poor soil quality.
Several recent and working papers by Bollinger and Gillingham (2012); Graziano and Gillingham
(2015); Baranzini et al. (2017) have explored the role of peer effects in solar panel adoption and have
made important progress in developing techniques to address the challenges described by previous authors.
Towe and Lawley (2013) identified peer effects among homes in a neighborhood in the context of home
foreclosures. There are important similarities between WSL program adoption and solar panel adoption,
but the existence of a peer effect has not been explored in “cash for grass” style subsidy programs.
Bollinger and Gillingham (2012) exploit the lag between the decision to adopt and actual installation
of solar panels to address the reflection problem. Graziano and Gillingham (2015) handle the definition of
peers in a spatially disaggregated manner, which avoids some kinds of boundary problems that aggregating
to a geopolitical boundary induced in Bollinger and Gillingham (2012). Graziano and Gillingham also use
a rich set of spatial and temporal fixed effects to address correlated unobservables. The core analytical
method used by each of Bollinger and Gillingham; Graziano and Gillingham and in the Baranzini et al.
(2017) working paper are variations on linear regression with fixed effects at an appropriate level of spatial
aggregation. They estimate the space and time specific fraction or count of eligible places that may adopt
solar panels in that time step. This method does not explicitly address the fact that solar panel adoption
is a one-time event, and places that have already installed solar panels cannot do so again, no matter
how much stronger the influential factors may become. Thus, hazard models such as that employed by
Towe and Lawley may be conceptually more appropriate to study peer effects in one-time behaviors.
The Cox proportional hazard model Towe and Lawley employ implicitly requires a strictly multi-
plicative relationship between the various factors influencing the household hazard rate. An additive or
additive-multiplicative relationship between the various factors that influence participation (as allowed
in the linear models employed by Gillingham and co-authors) is desirable. A purely multiplicative model
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forces the hazard rate to zero if either one of the epidemic or endemic effects is zero. This does not
happen in models where the hazard rate is instead a superposition of epidemic and endemic effects, as
in our case or additive-multiplicative survival models as in Höhle et al. (2005); Höhle (2008, 2009). An
additive-multiplicative model, which allows for non-zero probabilities of participation when some factors
are zero might be more appropriate in cases like ours, where we want to allow a baseline participation
probability to contribute to the hazard rate even in the event the peer effect is zero (and vice versa).
However, the types of hazards models that have been employed in the economics literature cannot be
recast into an additive-multiplicative model, while SEIR style models from mathematical epidemiology
can be.
In order to combine and extend the novel contributions of each of these papers, we follow Bollinger and
Gillingham’s approach to address reflection issues by using the gap between the decision to participated
in the WSL program and actual adoption. We fully exploit the spatially rich parcel level nature of our
dataset to develop an accurate, household specific model of peers, additionally exploring the importance
of both Euclidean and on-road travel distance to define the set of peers attributed to each home. Finally,
drawing from and extending the ideas used by Towe and Lawley to select a hazard model as the main
choice for inference, we model the influence of peers using an epidemic modeling approach on networks
at the household level which permits an additive/multiplicative model of influence.
The language of contagion, infection, and transmission has been widely used in economic research
on peer effects but the application of the mathematical tools developed for the purpose of modeling
disease transmission in this context is novel. The epidemic modeling approach we use allows the use
of an additive/multiplicative model of influence instead of a strictly multiplicative model, even within
a hazards context. It also permits complete flexibility in modeling transmission dynamics on networks
and makes the implicit network structure used in the aggregate linear models completely explicit. This
allows adoption patterns on the actual network to be simulated, so predicted transmission dynamics
can be compared to actual dynamics. Because self-sorting into neighborhoods (homophily) and other
correlated unobservables change slowly relative to the rate of program adoption, comparison of simulated
temporal dynamics with or without a peer effect to actual temporal dynamics should provide evidence
about the existence of a peer effect without bias from homophily and correlated unobservables. Finally,
networked epidemic models of peer effects open an opportunity to explore a variety of factors that have
been considered in epidemiological studies, but not in a conservation program adoption context. For
example, this method could be used to study how spatial properties of neighborhoods and cities might
influence program adoption; or allow simulation for how targeted campaigns may speed program adoption.
In this paper, we strive to use the language of both epidemiology and economics in a way that is
intelligible to readers in either field. A home that has had a landscape conversion recorded through
WSL can be referred to as active or infected. In this paper, the epidemic effect is synonymous with the
economic term peer effect : the role that one home’s WSL adoption behavior plays in influencing their
neighbors’ eventual participation probabilities. The endemic effect contains all of the reasons a household
might participate in WSL except for the influence of their neighbors’ participation, and is thus a major
component of an individual homes activation probability. A home that autoinfects is one that becomes
active independent from the influence of their neighbors.
We adapt epidemic modeling tools to the inference of peer effects by mathematically modelling the
dynamics of participation in the WSL program as a discrete-time epidemic spreading model SEIR with
autoinfection. In contrast with standard epidemic models, we allow a house to activate, i.e. adopt the
program, because of a combination of endemic causes in addition to the standard epidemic transmission,
where infection is ‘transmitted’ along the network by a neighboring house through the process of social
influence.
A susceptible home in this model is one that has no recorded prior WSL conversions. An exposed
home is one that has submitted an application for a WSL conversion to the SNWA, and thus has already
made the decision to activate, but has not yet completed the landscape conversion process. Infectious
homes have completed the landscape conversion process as required by SNWA, and so their changed
landscape is visible to their neighbors. A home that has recovered is one in which the WSL conversion
has happened sufficiently long ago that it no longer influences its neighbors activation probability, not
that the home has reverted from a xeric landscape back to turf.
We find evidence of peer effects in several of the sample neighborhoods. The presence of WSL
participating neighbors increases a non-participating house’s probability of adoption. For neighborhoods
where we see a peer effect, the inclusion of this effect in addition to the endemic effect means that we both
obtain better model likelihoods, and we are also better able to predict the evolution of adoption dynamics
for several months after the observation period. These two strategies for identifying the best model will
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not necessarily provide the same result. In addition, we find that a WSL participating neighbors’ influence
on their peers fades in time with finite recovery rates on the order of a few months to a year, after which
the influence fades.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 covers the relevant history of the
WSL program and other important characteristics of the adoption environment in Las Vegas during the
study period. Section 3 describes the dataset we use. Section 4 describes the analytical methods used.
Section 5 presents the results of the conditional probability estimates, as well as inference and prediction
performance results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Program Background & Context
Las Vegas relies heavily on the Colorado River for its urban water supply. About 90% of Las Vegas’
water supply is withdrawn from Lake Mead, created in 1936 with the construction of the Hoover Dam.
Withdrawals are strictly regulated through the Colorado River Compact and other related interstate
agreements on how Colorado River water is shared. The Colorado River Compact allots Nevada a fixed
annual withdrawal of 370 million m3 (300,000 acre-feet) of water from the Colorado River. Las Vegas’
treated waste water is returned to lake Mead via the Las Vegas Wash, and the Metro area is given full
credit for all water that is returned back to Lake Mead. Nearly all water that is used indoors in Las
Vegas flows through the sewer system and is returned to lake Mead, while nearly all water that is lost
to evapo-transpiration. This return flow credit creates a strong incentive for Las Vegas to focus their
conservation policy on reducing outdoor water consumption, and WSL has been the cornerstone of Las
Vegas’ outdoor water conservation strategy.
Southern Nevada Water Authority (SNWA) began the WSL program in 1996 as a small pilot pro-
gram then called Southern Nevada Xeriscapes. WSL has always been a completely voluntary, incentive
based program. Owners receive a rebate check in response for removing grass or swimming pools and
replacing it with ’Water Smart Landscapes’. Over the course of its history, WSL has paid residential and
commercial landowners between $4.30 and $21.50 per square meter of grass removed and replaced with
xeric landscaping. In July 2000 the program took on its modern form by issuing rebates to customers
who converted their lawns to desert landscaping based upon the size of the converted area, although it
became a widespread and important aspect of Las Vegas’ water supply security plan during the 2002-2004
drought. Fig. 1 shows the cumulative area of WSL conversions over the program’s history, demonstrating
how it grew from a relatively small-scale program to a widespread and important aspect of SNWA’s water
supply security plan after the 2004 drought declaration. During the programs pilot phase, rebate values
were $4.31/m2 ($0.40/ft2). In February 2003, this was increased to $10.73/m2 ($1.00/ft2). In Decem-
ber 2006, this was further increased to $21.51/m2 ($2.00/ft2). In January 2008, the rebate value was
reduced to $16.15/m2 $1.50/ft2. This remained until October 2015, when the value was again increased
to $21.51/m2 ($2.00/ft2). Throughout the program’s history, there have been limits on the maximum
rebate available for residential consumers, and a tired structure where the first area converted receives
the full rebate value, and additional areas beyond that receive a lower rebate per-square foot. The tiers
and caps on rebate area and total rebate amount are set at high enough values that they are likely to
have had little influence on conversion behavior for single family residential homes.1
SNWA notes that typical landscape conversions cost about $15 per m2 ($1.40 per square foot in 2000
dollars), although higher end landscapes can cost substantially more Sovocool et al. (2006); Southern
Nevada Water Authority (2018) This means that for more recent WSL cohorts, the rebate incentive
could cover most of the cost of a typical conversion. A more detailed history of the WSL rebate structure
and limits is outlined in Brelsford (2014).
SNWA’s efforts at marketing the program have also evolved over the programs lifespan. In its early
phase, WSL was marketed at individual community events, and the communication message was generally
aimed at describing what Xeriscaping is, and informing residents that the WSL program existed. Later,
messaging changed to describing what purpose grass serves in a desert environment, communicating
with ideas like “if you only walk on your grass to push a lawnmower, you may want to think about
replacing with Xeriscaping” or “you do not need wall-to-wall carpeting if an area rug will do!” These
messages were explained using mass communication and paid advertising. More recently, knowledge
1In August 2000, the cap was 230 m2, which was increased to 5,800 m2 in Feb 2002, and further raised to 46,000 m2,
while the median lot size is 650 m2 and the 99th percentile lot is 2,990 m2. Even the earliest cap, in August 2000 still
allowed the full rebate to be afforded to 90% of conversion participants, and per household conversion size has generally
fallen, rather than increased, as the program ages. Thus, is appears likely that these caps were primarily targeted at large
commercial facilities such as golf courses.
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of both what Xeriscaping, or Water Smart Landscapes are is widespread, and SNWA’s WSL focused
marketing efforts have been more based on individually targeted mailers concurrently with a semi-annual
citywide advertising push to remind consumers to update their irrigation clock with the changing seasons.
There were substantial targeted mailings sent out in spring and summer 2007, roughly concurrent with
the brief period where the WSL rebate was at its highest.
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Figure 1: Cumulative WSL conversion area in acres and the nominal WSL rebate at that time. We group
WSL participants into four cohort groups based on the nominal rebate price they received. Cohort 1 in-
cludes households that participated before February 2003, Cohort 2 includes households that participated
between March 2003 and December 2006, Cohort 3 includes January to December 2007 conversions, and
Cohort 4 includes households that participated after January 2008.
During the study period, municipal governance in the Las Vegas metro area also passed a number
of restrictions on the use and installation of water intensive outdoor features including grass, swimming
pools, and other water features. In November 2000 the first limits on turf installation in new construction
were passed, requiring that front yards be no more than 50% turf. In June 2003, an ordinance was passed
that restricts the size of pools and water features permitted in new construction, and also restricts the
use of grass to less than half of the back yard area and prohibits it entirely in front yards. There have
been minor changes in building code since 2003, but the general restrictions as applied to single family
residential homes have remained consistent. Changes to municipal code apply to new construction only.
The 2008 recession had a dramatic effect on Las Vegas’ economy and home values. Regional GDP
fell by 13% between 2007 and 2010, and recovered to the pre-recession levels in 2015 U.S. Bureau of
Economic Analysis (2018). Unemployment rose from 4% to 13% between 2007 and 2010, and has now
declined back to about 5% U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2018). Between 2006 and 2012, home values
fell from 2.5 times the 1995 housing price index back to their 1995 value and have since been slowly
recovering U.S. Federal Housing Finance Agency (2018). Foreclosure rates rose to nearly 10% (among
the highest in the nation) when 32,000 homes were foreclosed upon in 2009 Hogan (2016). This also
created large numbers of vacant homes, a problem that still challenges the region Segall (2017). By the
end of the study period in 2015, the economy had largely rebounded. The recession was associated both
with reduced WSL rebate values in Jan 2008, and also a significant slow down in housing stock growth
rates, from 16,000 new homes constructed per year at the 2004-2005 peak, to only 2,500 in 2009 Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2018). This recession is likely to have influenced WSL participation, but
the directionality is unclear. Cash-strapped homeowners may have sought out the WSL program for the
extra income it could provide, while, once a home is in foreclosure or vacant, it cannot participate.
Finally, Las Vegas’ rapid population growth and the associated new construction had a substantial
influence on the installed housing stock. In our dataset, the count of homes grew from 183,000 to 292,000
between 2000 and 2015, with the bulk of the new construction occurring before the 2008 recession. Fig. 2
shows all single family residential parcels in Las Vegas, colored by construction year, and demonstrates the
substantial growth in residential housing that has occurred in this period. The recent growth means that
about 25% of Las Vegas’ housing stock was constructed after the 2003 restrictions on turf grass in new
construction had been implemented, making them much less attractive candidates for WSL participation
because of the initial limits on turf.
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Figure 2: Single Family residential parcels, colored by construction year. Multi-Family or temporary
residential structures such as duplexes, apartments, townhouses, condos and mobile homes are colored
grey, and not included in this analysis. Sample neighborhoods are defined in purple, with a light grey
buffer zone delineating parcels that are potentially included in descriptions of a focal homes neighbors,
but are not themselves included in the analysis.
3 Data
The dataset used in this analysis is a nearly complete cross-section of single family homes in the Las Vegas
Valley Water District Service area. Fig. 2 shows a map of all households included in the consumption
dataset colored by their construction year. Out of the 463,658 single family homes in the Clark County
Tax Assessors records and 46,079 households in the WSL conservation program records, 299,158 homes
(including 29,752 WSL participants) are in the study area and so have matched records of residential
WSL participation and home physical characteristics. The 16,327 WSL participating households that
are not in the study area have similar physical characteristics to the participating homes that are in
the study area. Each record includes participation behavior and the home’s structural characteristics as
defined by the Clark County Assessors office in 2012. Structural characteristics include indoor area, lot
size, number of rooms, bathrooms, bedrooms, and plumbing fixtures, as well as the presence or absence
of a pool and 2012 assessed value. We exclude value data for 1,867 homes constructed in 2011 and 2012
because the homes did not yet have a valid assessed home value provided by the Assessors Office. We
exclude 36 households because the recorded indoor characteristics for the home are physically impossible.
Finally, we exclude 3,145 WSL participating households in the study area because they have multiple
recorded WSL conversions during the study period; we focus on homes with single conversions for the
sake of clean identification. This provides a complete, cleaned cross sectional dataset of 291,737 homes
and 24,206 WSL participants.
Clark County Assessors office files are used to provide spatial information on both the location of
individual homes and also the road networks necessary to calculate on-road travel distances between
pairs of homes.
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3.1 Descriptive Statistics
There is significant spatial and temporal clustering in the physical characteristics of homes. There are
significant differences in the characteristics of homes which did participate in the WSL program, and those
which did not. WSL participating homes have substantially larger lots, many more pools, are somewhat
more valuable, and have small increases in indoor size metrics including indoor area and number of
rooms compared to non-participating homes. Participating homes are also located in block groups with
higher homeownership rates, which is consistent with a policy incentive structure that primarily rewards
homeowners.2 Tab. 1 shows several key characteristics of WSL participating homes and non participating
homes for Las Vegas as a whole.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for Las Vegas housing.
Non Participants WSL Participants
Indoor Area (m2) 185.5 (81.3) 199.9 (85.0)
Lot Area (m2) 635.4 (478.8) 819.5 (704.4)
Outdoor Area (m2) 462.1 (435.4) 617.11 (658.5)
Rooms 6.50 (1.53) 6.72 (1.52)
Beds 3.38 (0.80) 3.48 (0.81)
Baths 2.24 (0.65) 2.31 (0.66)
Pool % 0.22 (0.42) 0.34 (0.47)
Value ($1,000) 50.99 (48.81) 57.97 (99.04)
Own %* 68.1 (17.3) 71.0 (17.4)
N 267,531 24,206
*ownership rates are inferred from block group level reporting
standard errors in parentheses
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Figure 3: Estimated coefficients from a logistic regression with a dummy variable for each construction
year, demonstrating that homes constructed after 2003 are much less likely to participate in the WSL
program.
Homes that were built after the 2003 turf restrictions had been enacted are much less likely to partici-
pate in the WSL program. Fig 3 shows the results of a simple logistic regression exploring the conditional
probability of WSL participation dependent on only a dummy variable for construction year, with 2012
as the baseline year. It is clear from this figure that the odds of WSL participation fall dramatically
after about 2003, with no rebound yet apparent. A home has a 12% probability of participating in WSL
if it was built in 2003 or sooner, and only a 1% chance of participating if it was built in 2004 or later.
Additionally, if a home constructed after 2003 did participate, they converted smaller areas, even though
on average they had larger lot sizes. This suggests that there may be a substantial, and growing, share
2Ownership rates are inferred by attributing to each home the block group level probability of a home being owner
occupied vs renter occupied. This method is likely to underestimate the true difference.
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of the Las Vegas housing stock which is ineligible for participation in the WSL program because there
was no turf initially installed.
4 Methods
In this section, we explore the conditional probability of WSL adoption, describe the sampling method
used to select focal neighborhoods and describe how ‘peers’ or neighbors are defined for each household
within each neighborhood. We next describe the main epidemic model, show how this model can be
mapped into a hazard model, and finally discuss how we measure the epidemic effect.
4.1 Logistic Regression
In order to describe the conditional probabilities of participation for homes with different physical char-
acteristics, we use a simple logistic regression where the dependent variable is the log of the odds of WSL
participation, and the independent variables are drawn from construction year, value, the presence of a
swimming pool, lot size, outdoor area, and the size of the home. It is also important to point out that
participating in the WSL program is a finite choice. The terms of the WSL program prohibit homeown-
ers from replacing rebated xeric landscaping with turf, a prohibition that is maintained through a deed
restriction even after the home is sold. There is a limited amount of turf on any property and once all
turf has been removed, the home cannot participate further in the WSL program.3 As a result, homes
that once chose to participate cannot do so after all the turf on the property has been removed, no matter
how large other influential factors grow. The directionality of WSL participation means that a hazard
model rather than a logistic model is more appropriate for formally estimating the influence of various
factors on WSL participation, and especially the existence of any potential peer effect.
4.2 Neighborhood Selection
Running an epidemic transmission model on the entire city of Las Vegas would be prohibitively expensive
from a computational perspective, and so we randomly sample neighborhoods.
Neighborhoods are selected by identifying sixteen randomly selected single family residential parcels
(defined as seed parcels) within the complete dataset. A 1.5 km buffer is then drawn around that seed
parcel, and all single family homes within this buffer zone are included in the core neighborhood for each
seed parcel. An additional 0.5 km buffer is drawn around each core neighborhood; homes in this buffer
zone are included in the assessment of the characteristics of each homes’ neighbors to avoid boundary
problems in the identification of peers, but homes in the buffer zone are not analyzed as part of the
neighborhood. Because the seed parcels are randomly selected, some neighborhoods overlap. Homes that
are contained in (for example) both seed neighborhood 1 and 3 are included in the analysis for both
neighborhoods.
4.3 Network and Neighborhood Definition
While some models used to study peer effects consider cumulative count data at ZIP-code and street level
Bollinger and Gillingham (2012); Richter (2013) and within a certain euclidean distance Graziano and
Gillingham (2015), here we fully exploit the rich spatial detail in our dataset and consider a more refined
network structure which allows to model the probability of program participation at a an individual
household level. A similar approach has been considered in Towe and Lawley (2013), where they build
a network of neighbors interactions based on the first k nearest neighbors within a radius of euclidean
distance. There are several methods available for defining exactly which nearby pairs of houses qualify
as neighbors. Here we define the distance between a pair of homes in two different ways: the euclidean
distance de between the two homes, and the on-road travel distance dn between the same two homes.
On-road travel distance is calculated by creating a spatially embedded network of all parcels and roads
in a given neighborhood. Fig 4 compares the on-road travel distance to Euclidean distance for all pairs
of homes in one Las Vegas neighborhood. We then select a threshold τd, and two homes in a given
neighborhood are defined neighbors if the distance between them is less than the selected threshold τd.
Formally, this is represented by creating an unweighted edge between the two houses. We apply three
3Roughly 10% of homes in the WSL population had multiple approved conversions, removing some and then eventually
all of the turf on the property. In this study, homes with multiple conversions are excluded.
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Table 2: Summary statistics for all sample neighborhoods.
Seed Homes Year Built Outdoor Area Value ($) Pool % Own % WSL
1 3,344 1974.8 (10.03) 516.9 (288.2) 20,511 (10,698) 0.18 0.55 163
2 4,943 1991.3 (2.50) 457.4 (187.6) 66,196 (27,539) 0.32 0.75 694
3 5,353 1993.2 (4.98) 414.3 (267.2) 71,450 (74,555) 0.33 0.64 708
4 6,034 1992.0 (4.80) 400.2 (186.0) 62,663 (29,411) 0.34 0.68 798
5 5,011 1998.3 (4.50) 412.7 (204.5) 76,100 (38,644) 0.30 0.66 521
6 4,070 1957.0 (9.39) 528.1 (140.3) 21,970 (18,280) 0.23 0.59 300
7 3,607 2004.4 (1.74) 269.1 (145.8) 53,882 (18,608) 0.09 0.52 126
8 699 2004.3 (2.45) 970.5 (757.7) 282,395 (254,273) 0.60 0.89 49
9 5,984 2004.8 (1.95) 251.4 (180.1) 55,547 (28,333) 0.12 0.60 78
10 4,882 1997.0 (3.67) 416.0 (324.6) 50,768 (27,554) 0.28 0.79 466
11 1,950 1989.0 (7.34) 608.2 (735.1) 46,788 (26,663) 0.26 0.66 266
12 2,645 1967.0 (10.16) 727.8 (613.0) 41,308 (37,481) 0.43 0.64 288
13 3,433 1997.4 (6.40) 552.2 (583.8) 52,410 (20,682) 0.28 0.86 509
14 1,839 2008.1 (1.84) 254.9 (99.9) 50,241 (21,167) 0.05 0.86 9
15 6,316 1997.1 (4.77) 396.5 (232.7) 52,411 (19,209) 0.22 0.71 843
16 7,033 2001.9 (2.98) 264.8 (144.2) 45,457 (15,391) 0.15 0.62 360
All 61,385 1993.0 (14.42) 415.8 (342.2) 54,827 (51,120) 0.23 0.67 5,431
City 291,737 1992.1 (14.68) 475.0 (460.1) 51,566 (54,789) 0.23 0.68 24,206
Standard errors in parentheses
thresholds: 0.1, 0.2 and 0.3 km to the two different distance measures to create six different networks on
which to test the existence of a peer effect.
We use both euclidean distance and on-network travel distance in these models because euclidean
distance is the standard approach and computationally simpler, but on road travel distance is a more
relevant measure of likely peers in Las Vegas’ car centered urban layout. Homes that are physically nearby
but on different streets, for example ‘back yard neighbors’, may have very little potential for interaction,
and thus little potential for influence.
4.4 Epidemic Model
We mathematically model the dynamics of the participation in the WSL program as a discrete-time
epidemic spreading model (SEIR) with autoinfection. In contrast to standard epidemic models, we allow
a house to activate because of a combination of endemic causes in addition to the standard epidemic
transmission.
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Figure 4: The purple line shows the line with slope 1. Red shows the best fit line, slope 0.7. Note that
there is substantial variability in the mapping from parcel to parcel euclidean distance and on-road travel
distance.
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In contrast to standard economic survival models, this mechanistic network approach allows for a
straightforward representation of peer effects by accounting for an explicit and direct interaction between
neighboring houses by means of an epidemic transmission parameter and a well defined network structure.
Nodes in the network are houses and the set of all nodes is denoted by V . Edges are created between
neighboring houses when the distance between the two homes is less than the distance threshold selected
as described in section 4.3.
Finally, in contrast to the methods studied in Young (2009) in the context of innovation spreading,
where they assume that members of a group interact more or less at random, in our case information
flows between individuals in a fixed network and the dynamics are explicitly influenced by the specific
network topology considered.
We assume that a house i can be in any of four states xti ∈ {S,E, I,R} representing susceptible,
exposed, infected and recovered respectively. The allowed transitions in state are S → E, E → I and
I → R and once a node is recovered it will remain in that state forever (irreversible dynamics). A
susceptible house i can become exposed with a probability α whenever one of its neighbors j is infected.
This captures the peer effect that results from a WSL participating household influencing a nearby
non-participating household. Differently from a standard epidemic model Kermack and McKendrick
(1932); Anderson et al. (1992), we allow households to participate in the program independently from
their neighbors with a probability µti at each time step t, and we call this autoinfection probability, which
represents the endemic component. This assumption allows us to capture the possibility that a household
chose to participate because of a global effect that affects all houses equally, because of a house-dependent
local effect that affects each houses differently based on a set of covariates, or any other reason independent
of neighborhood based peer effects. Examples of the global effect are city-wide marketing campaigns,
or peer effects through friends and colleagues who are not neighbors. The house-dependent local effect
includes covariates like house value, construction year, and outdoor area that are associated with the
decision to participate.
In addition to considering finite recovery periods, we also consider a recovery period of infinite length,
which in practice means that a WSL participating homes’ influence on their neighbors never fades, and
is equivalent to the SEI model in epidemiology.
In summary: we assume that a house can chose to participate in WSL (become active) by either
autoinfection or contagion from its active neighbors. Calling µ the N -dimensional vector with i-th entry
µti, the probability the house i autoinfects at time t, and α the transmission probability from house i
to house j, we can write the probability of the state of a house at a given time step xti. In principle
the transmission parameter could depend both on time and on the combination (i, j) of houses involved.
However, this considerably increases the number of parameters and thus the risk of overfitting. Moreover,
we do not have any prior knowledge about pairwise relationship between houses that would support the
idea of treating them differently. Therefore in this work we assume that α is constant in time and does
not depend on what pairs of houses we consider (whereas the autoinfection probability µti differs from
house to house). The duration of the exposed period E → I is given as measured for each household.
For simplicity we also assume that an infected house switches to recovered after a fixed period of time τR
from the time it first became infective tiI , with the latter quantity depending on the house considered.
Notice that this implies that the only stochastic quantity is the activation time: the time of switching
S → E. We can write the probability of a house i activating at time tiE , given its initial state x0i and
the state of its neighbors in time as:
P (tiE = ti > 0|α, µ) = Ix0i=S
[
ti−1∏
t=1
P (xti = S|α, µ)
]
P (S → E, ti|α, µ)
= Ix0i=S
ti−1∏
t=1
(1− µti)
∏
k∈∂i|tkI<ti−1
(1− α)ti−τkiI−1

× [1− (1− µtii )(1− α)ni] (1)
for ti ∈ [0, T ], where ni is the number of neighbors of i that are infected at time ti and τkiI is the number
of time steps that neighbor k had to infect house i, i.e. τkiI = tkI if tkI+τR > ti, τkiI = τR if tkI+τR ≤ ti;
∂i denotes the set of neighbors of i.
Unlike the parameter estimates from a hazard model (as in Towe and Lawley), α is directly inter-
pretable as the transmission probability: the probability that a non-participating home will be ‘infected’
in a given month by one of their infectious neighbors, and is bounded between zero and one. Outside
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of corner cases, the probability that a non-participating home will be infected by this neighbor is then
(1− (1− α)τR), from the last component of (1).
For a house that never activates before time T , we define tiE = ∞ and its trajectory in time has
probability:
P (tiE =∞|α, µ) = Ix0i=S
T∏
t=1
P (xti = S|α, µ)
= Ix0i=S
T∏
t=1
(1− µti)
∏
k∈∂i|tkI<T
(1− α)T−τkiI (2)
The joint probability of all houses’ trajectories is represented as P (t¯|α, µ) = P (t1, . . . , tN |α, µ) and is
factorized on the nodes as:
P (t¯|α, µ) =
∏
i∈V
P (tiE |α, µ) (3)
and the log likelihood can be derived by inserting (1) and (2) into (3) and taking the logarithm (see
appendix 8.1). Notice that other versions of epidemic models are easily obtained from this general
formulation. For instance, an SI model is obtained by setting τiE = tiI − tiE = 0 and τR =∞.
Notice that tiE are the observed data, while α, µ are parameters that need to be estimated. Our goal
here is to estimate the value of the transmission parameter α and see if it shows evidence of peer effects.
We define evidence of a peer effect through two steps: i) if we find that α = 0 according to our model,
this is interpreted as no peer effect because the transmission probability is zero; ii) if we find that α > 0,
then we compare this model with the model where α is fixed at zero. If the former is better (see Section
4.7 for the model selection criteria we use) then we interpret this result as evidence that the peer effect
is present: the model that has a non-zero transmission probability better fits the observed data than a
model where no peer effect is included.
4.5 Mapping the Epidemic Model into a Hazard Model
A common model used in economic, marketing or sociology literature to describe contagion dynamics is
the hazard model, as used, for instance, to study similar problems in Bollinger and Gillingham (2012);
Iyengar et al. (2011); Aral and Walker (2012); Towe and Lawley (2013). An additive-multiplicative
regression model has also been introduced in epidemiology Höhle et al. (2005); Höhle (2008, 2009) to
study the spread of diseases along with an R package Meyer et al. (2017). However a clear mapping
between the mechanistic epidemic modeling described in Section 4.4 and hazard models as defined in
the context of survival analysis is still lacking. Here we propose such mapping showing (see appendix
8.2) that the discrete-time versions of the additive-multiplicative hazard model presented in Höhle (2008,
2009) using the formalism of counting processes is equivalent to the mechanistic discrete-time SEIR model
with autoinfection described above when:
log
[− log (1− µti)] = x¯i · β¯ + log λt0 (4)
where λt0 is the baseline hazard at time t which represents a global contribution to the probability of
getting infected which is the same for all houses; x¯i is a vector of covariates and β¯ is a vector of parameters
coupling the covariates, in a similar way as in regression analysis. The model in Höhle (2008, 2009) does
not consider event ties, i.e. activation events happening at the same time. This is due to the formalism of
counting processes that does not account for them, although in principle one can avoid them by adding
a random and small perturbation to the events’ times so to resolve ties. In our problem we have access
to the exact program’s application date (day, month and year). Although this does not completely rule
out ties, two houses could potentially file the same day, the precise day of filing might not be as precisely
determined than the month of application. In fact the application date can be influenced by delays in
delivering the documents or in the administrative time to process it. In other words, the exact day might
be affected by an error of several days. To account for this we use as time step in describing the dynamical
process a unit of one month (delays of months in the previous two factors are much less likely) so that we
count as exposure time tiE the month when the application was filed. With this time unit we are subject
to event ties, but our discrete time mechanistic epidemic model is not affected by it because we consider
parallel updates (as opposed to sequential): all the network’s nodes update at the same time, given the
network state at the previous time step.
11
From (4) we can see that the autoinfection probability µti of the epidemic model is mapped into a
combination of a (time-dependent) global contribution represented by the baseline hazard and a node-
dependent contribution due to the node covariates x¯i as in a regression framework. This mapping is
allowed by the additive way through which the epidemic and endemic terms are coupled together. A
similar straightforward mapping between epidemic and hazard model cannot be obtained in the case
of a multiplicative hazard model (as used in Towe and Lawley (2013)), because in that case these two
terms cannot be trivially decoupled (see appendix 8.2). In fact a purely multiplicative model has the
property that if either one of the epidemic or endemic effect is zero, than the overall hazard rate is zero,
regardless the other effect. This is not the case in models where the hazard rate is instead a superposition
of epidemic and endemic effects, as in our case or for additive-multiplicative survival models.
In this work we consider as house covariates: the build year, outdoor area, value, percentage of house
ownership in the block, presence of a pool and a dummy variable indicating whether or not the house
was built before 2003: These are in fact the main covariates influencing the probability of participation
resulting from logistic regression (see Section 5.1).
4.6 Inference
Now we turn our attention to estimating the value of α which we will use to assess the presence of peer
effects, as explained above. We use maximum likelihood inference on the epidemic model’s likelihood
integrated with house level covariates. This can be obtained by combining (3) with the mapping (4).
This allows us to capture household level variations in autoinfection probability and thus control for
heterogeneity among individual home characteristics.
By doing this, the log likelihood of the system can be written as a function of the covariates as:
L(t¯|λt0, β¯, α) =
∑
i∈V |x¯Ti =S
− T∑
t=1
λt0 e
x¯i·β¯ +
∑
k∈∂i|tkI<T
(T − tkiI) log(1− α)
+ (5)
+
∑
i∈V |x¯Ti 6=S
 ∑
k∈∂i|tkI<tiE−1
(tiE − τkiI − 1) log(1− α) + log
[
1−
(
e−λ
t
0
)ex¯i·β¯
(1− α)ni
]
−
tiE−1∑
t=1
λt0 e
x¯i·β¯
]
The maximum likelihood estimator Θˆ = (λt0, β¯, α) = arg supΘ L(t¯|λt0, β¯, α) is a complicated polyno-
mial, and it is difficult to analytically derive the derivatives with respect to the parameters, so we use
standard bounded numerical optimization methods as L-BFGS-B Byrd et al. (1995) with constraints on
the parameters such that 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 and 0 ≤
(
e−λ
t
0
)ex¯i·β¯
≤ 1.
Here we consider a piece-wise constant baseline hazard λt0 which is constant within three intervals
defined by the rebate price windows in months: [Jan 2004, Dec 2006], [Jan 2007, Dec 2007] and [Jan
2008, Dec 2015] as shown in Fig. 1. These price changes were also temporally consistent with other
major environmental changes in the Las Vegas metro area. The only sustained marketing campaign for
WSL participation that SNWA staff have reported to us occurred in spring and fall of 2007, roughly
coincident with the highest rebate price. Similarly, the price change in Jan 2008 occurred at the same
time as the most dramatic effects of the 2008 recession were becoming apparent. Thus, we believe
these breakpoints are good candidates for capturing global effects. The estimated standard errors of the
parameters are obtained from the relation with the Fisher information matrix Pawitan (2001), which is
derived by numerically calculating the Hessian of the log likelihood function (5).
4.7 Measuring the Epidemic Effect
To test whether an epidemic contribution in the dynamics of adoption exists we adopt two different
strategies. First, from an inference perspective, the model with lower Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)
Akaike (1974) between the case where there is no peer effect, α = 0, and the case where the peer effect is
present, α > 0 is more likely to be correct. Secondly, from a prediction perspective we select the model
the has higher predictive performance. Notice that, arguably counter intuitively, these two strategies may
give different results as shown in different contexts in Shao (1993); Vallès-Català et al. (2017). In both the
12
inference and prediction models, we use a spatially accurate network structure, that does not induce any
boundary conditions. Our break between the exposed and infectious stages of the SEIR model handles
challenges associated with reflection. The covariates regarding home characteristics, which are wrapped
into the estimate of µi, manage some homophily and correlated unobservables problems. Additionally,
in the prediction analysis, we capitalize on the fact that correlated unobservable characteristics about
physical neighborhood characteristics and the neighborhoods residents are likely to change slowly relative
to the WSL adoption rate, and so the temporal dynamics of adoption can be a strong signal for the
existence of peer effects. When both prediction and inference methods suggest the existence of peer
effects, we believe that this is a strong and conservative signal that the effect exists in a meaningful way.
5 Results
5.1 Conditional Probabilities of Participation
Using a very simple logistic regression to explore the characteristics that are associated with eventual
WSL participation, we find that across the city as a whole, whether the home was built before or after
2003 is the single best available determinant of WSL participation. The presence of a pool is the next most
significant factor associated with WSL participation. Larger in lot areas and indoor areas are associated
with a small increased likelihood of WSL participation, while (after controlling for size) increased value is
associated with a decreased likelihood of participation. Tab. 3 shows results. We find that for the typical
house without a pool, the probability of participating in the WSL program is 0.07. The probability of
a house participating in the WSL program if they do have a pool is 0.12. The probability of a house
participating in the WSL program if it was built before 2003 and has a pool is 0.14, but if it was built after
2003 and doesn’t have a pool, it’s only 0.01. Adding various physical descriptors of the home and property
(Lot Area, Value, and Indoor Area) only has a small influence on the conditional probability of these
two major factors: for the typical pre-2003 house with a pool, decreasing the value by $10,000, combined
with increasing the lot area and indoor area by 10 m2 each only changes the conditional probability from
0.119 to 0.122, from column (3). While statistically significant, these differences are not important in
practice. In column (4) of Tab. 3, we demonstrate that separating homes into those constructed before
and after the 2003 turf restrictions occurred is more consistent with the structure of the data than using
dummy variables by individual decades of construction. Fig 3 shows the coefficients and standard errors
for this regression if a dummy variable is included for each possible construction year. This further
demonstrates the empirical support for the 2003 split in the effect of home construction year on WSL
participation. Column (5) shows the effect of including spatial fixed effects at the census tract level,
which again somewhat decreases the marginal effect of pools and the effect of Post-2003 construction.
These results motivates the choice of covariates used in fitting the epidemic model of Section 4.5.
5.2 Inference Performance
In Tab. 5.2 we show the inference results for three models of each neighborhood, one for each of the
different methods for selecting potential peers: i) using euclidean travel distance between pairs of homes,
ii) using on-road travel distance between homes, and iii) the purely endemic model with no peers at all.
Two further parameters need to be selected: recovery time and distance threshold (τR, τd).
In order to parsimoniously present results, we select τR = 12 (in months) as the preferred τR value.
The results presented in Tab. 5.2 reflect this value with additional values of τR presented in appendix Tab.
8.2. This recovery period was selected after testing values τR ∈ {1, 4, 6, 12,∞}, and finding that in general,
τR = 12 has the lowest AIC values among the models we tested. We find that the results for τR ∈ {4, 6}
are broadly consistent with the results found when τR = 12. They have a statistically significant α > 0
and a lower AIC than the model in which peer effects are excluded (α = 0). For τR ∈ {1,∞} we find that
α is more often indistinguishable from zero and AIC values are higher, demonstrating that models with a
measurable peer effect fit the data better, and the temporal duration of that peer effect is about a year.4
One possible explanation for this is that the cases τR ∈ {1,∞} are two extremes: either the recovery
is too fast and thus it does not allow for enough time for the contagion to happen or it never ends, so
that neighbors who had activated years ago exercise the same peer effect as recently activated neighbors.
The latter case represents the standard SEI model, where an active individual is always infectious. Our
4Note that we are selecting preferred models on the basis of a better model fit, not a positive α value, but the model
parameters that lead to a positive α value also fit the data better than models where the selected parameters result in
α = 0.
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Table 3: Logistic regressions exploring conditional probability of participation in WSL during the study
period. Lot Area, Value, Year Built, and Indoor Area are normalized to 0, so that the constant represents
probability of participation of the ‘typical’, pre-2003 house, which works out to roughly a 7% probability.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pool +Turf Policy +Home +Build Year +Tracts
WSL
Has Pool 0.599∗∗∗ 0.422∗∗∗ 0.225∗∗∗ 0.305∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗
(0.0143) (0.0145) (0.0160) (0.0162) (0.0165)
Built after 2003 -2.278∗∗∗ -2.294∗∗∗ -1.987∗∗∗
(0.0365) (0.0371) (0.0452)
Value ($10,000) -0.00985∗∗∗ -0.0179∗∗∗ -0.0102∗∗∗
(0.00211) (0.00163) (0.00169)
Lot Area (10m2) 0.00271∗∗∗ 0.00347∗∗∗ 0.00221∗∗∗
(0.000129) (0.000135) (0.000157)
Indoor Area (10m2) 0.0182∗∗∗ 0.0166∗∗∗ 0.00980∗∗∗
(0.00137) (0.00121) (0.00130)
Construction Decade FE No No No Yes No
Tract level FE No No No No Yes
Constant -2.569∗∗∗ -2.261∗∗∗ -2.227∗∗∗ -5.504∗∗∗ -2.263∗∗∗
(0.00821) (0.00846) (0.00864) (0.243) (0.227)
Observations 291737 291737 290188 290188 289950
Pseudo R2 0.010 0.057 0.063 0.045 0.093
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
finding that an SEIR model with τR ∈ {4, 6, 12} is preferred to an SEI model (at least in terms of AIC)
suggests that contagion effect fades out with time. Graziano and Gillingham (2015) obtained similar
results on the duration of influence when analyzing contagion effects in solar panel installations.
There is less consistency across neighborhoods in model response to τd. We test values of τd ∈
{0.1, 0.2, 0.3} (in km), and for each individual neighborhood, select the τd value with the lowest AIC
value. In general, the choice of τd ∈ {0.1, 0.2, 0.3} does not have a large effect on α results or model fit. It
makes sense to allow the distance threshold for allowing peer effects to vary by neighborhood, as there is
significant variance in home density across our sample neighborhoods. We might expect neighborhoods
with small lot sizes to have a shorter distance threshold for peer effects than neighborhoods with large
lot sizes because so many more homes will be included in that range. Exhaustive combinations of models
with different (τR, τd) parameter choices are available from the authors upon request. Other constant
values or functional forms could have been considered for both the recovery time and distance thresholds,
but the values we have chosen are reasonable, consistent with the literature, and finding the best values
of these two parameters is beyond the scope of this paper.
Fig. 5 summarizes Tab. 5.2, comparing the estimated α values to the WSL participation rate in each
neighborhood. From this figure, it is clear that the majority of the neighborhoods show a statistically
significant α > 0, and that as WSL participation rates rise within each neighborhood, so too does the
magnitude of the peer effect, for both the Euclidean and On Road distance measures. Error bars show
the standard error.
Neighborhoods n ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 10, 13, 15, 16} show statistically significant and positive α estimates
at the 1% level for both the euclidean and on-network distance thresholds. Neighborhoods n ∈ {11, 12}
show positive α estimates that are only weakly significant (at the 10% level or greater for both distance
measures). Finally, neighborhoods n ∈ {1, 6, 8, 9, 14} either don’t have an epidemic effect or it is not
significant. Neighborhoods 8, 9 and 14 have the lowest counts of WSL participating homes, at 49, 78 and
9 homes respectively, and also have a median construction year after 2004, meaning that the majority
of homes were constructed with significant turf restrictions in place, a policy that may effectively put a
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Euclidean On RoadFigure 5: Estimated α values for Euclidean and On Road mo els presented in Tab. 5.2, compared to
neighborhood level WSL participation rates. Standard errors for neighborhood 14 (α = 0 with only 9
WSL participating homes) are not displayed, but would extend well beyond the range of the y-axis shown.
home in the recovered status from its construction onwards. These neighborhoods simply may not have
a large enough population of WSL participants for a peer effect to matter. The other two neighborhoods
with no measurable epidemic effect, n ∈ {1, 6} show the lowest average assessed home value (around
$21,000, relative to a citywide mean of $51,000) which is about half the average value of the next lowest
valued neighborhood in our sample. Because many neighborhoods in Las Vegas show convincing evidence
of a peer effect, its absence in some places should not be taken as evidence that peer influence has no
effect on WSL participation rates. This method has controlled for reflection challenges through use of
an SEIR model, and addressed some challenges with homophily and correlated unobservables through
careful selection of control variables and use of fixed effects. These results provide strong suggestive
evidence of peer effects in WSL participation at the neighborhood level.
5.3 Prediction Performance
We measure the predictive performance of the epidemic model using cross validation by dividing the data
into a training and test period. We infer the parameters (λt0, β¯, α) from the training period and measure
the model’s performance on the test period. This approach penalizes models with too many parameters:
if the model has been overfit in the training period, it will measure a poor performance on the test period.
In our case, the model with both endemic and epidemic components has one parameter more than the
corresponding model where only an endemic component is allowed. This implies that if the predictive
performance measured in the test period is lower for the model with an epidemic effect included, then
having one more parameter does not help prediction and we should prefer the model with only an endemic
component. We select Jan 2004 to Dec 2012 as the training period, and the final three years of data (Jan
2013 to Dec 2015) as the test period. We measure the models predictive performance as the ability to
predict how WSL participation evolves through time during the last 36 months and compare with the
observed dynamics. We use the parameters fitted on the training set to simulate the future dynamics
via Markov chain Monte Carlo simulation. We then calculate the root mean square error between the
average participation rate over 100 Monte Carlo realizations Iˆsim = (Iˆsim1 , . . . , IˆsimT ) and the observed
dynamics Iobs = (Iobs1 , . . . , IobsT ), where Iˆ
sim
t and Iobst are the ratios of participating houses (total number
of participating houses divided by the total number of houses in the focal area) at time t from the Monte
Carlo simulations and the observed dynamics respectively. Formally:
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Table 4: Maximum likelihood inference results. The recovery time is τR = 12 months; α is the epidemic
transmission parameter and STEα its standard error; τd is the distance threshold used to build the
network; WSL rate is the eventual WSL participation rate. Within each neighborhood’s results, models
are ordered by AIC, a measure of model fit.
Neighborhood Distance Metric AIC α STEα τd WSL rate No. Homes
1 euclidean 2855 0.00008∗ 0.00003 0.3 0.049 3344
no peer 2865
on-road 2867 0 0.000008 0.1
2 euclidean 10786 0.00012∗∗∗ 0.00002 0.3 0.141 4931
on-road 10813 0.00020∗∗∗ 0.00005 0.3
no peer 10835
3 on-road 10967 0.00021∗∗∗ 0.00004 0.3 0.132 5340
euclidean 10977 0.00012∗∗∗ 0.00003 0.2
no peer 11040
4 on-road 12412 0.00025∗∗∗ 0.00006 0.2 0.132 6027
euclidean 12415 0.00010∗∗∗ 0.00003 0.2
no peer 12471
5 euclidean 8402 0.00017∗∗ 0.00006 0.1 0.104 5003
on-road 8415 0.00015∗∗ 0.00005 0.3
no peer 8426
6 euclidean 5087 0.00006∗ 0.00003 0.3 0.074 4069
no peer 5091
on-road 5093 0 0.00005 0.3
7 on-road 2211 0.00027∗∗∗ 0.00008 0.3 0.035 3603
euclidean 2221 0.00026∗∗∗ 0.00006 0.2
no peer 2328
8 euclidean 835 0.00016 0.0001 0.3 0.07 696
on-road 835 0.00011 0.00022 0.2
no peer 836
9 on-road 1463 0.00012◦ 0.00007 0.3 0.013 5980
euclidean 1480 0.00001 0.00002 0.2
no peer 1485
10 euclidean 7525 0.00030∗∗∗ 0.00006 0.1 0.095 4859
on-road 7552 0.00022∗∗∗ 0.00005 0.3
no peer 7579
11 on-road 4050 0.00034◦ 0.0002 0.1 0.137 1946
euclidean 4053 0.00008◦ 0.00005 0.2
no peer 4071
12 euclidean 4553 0.00025∗ 0.00012 0.1 0.109 2637
on-road 4554 0.00027∗∗ 0.0001 0.3
no peer 4627
13 on-road 7601 0.00057∗∗∗ 0.00011 0.2 0.148 3409
euclidean 7607 0.00057∗∗∗ 0.00012 0.1
no peer 7709
14 no peer 212 0.005 1836
euclidean 217 0 0.00922 0.2
on-road 217 0 0.01138 0.3
15 euclidean 13053 0.00023∗∗∗ 0.00006 0.1 0.133 6300
on-road 13062 0.00017∗∗ 0.00005 0.2
no peer 13124
16 on-road 6016 0.00025∗∗∗ 0.00008 0.2 0.051 7021
euclidean 6020 0.00019∗∗ 0.00006 0.1
no peer 6229
◦ p < 0.1 ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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RMSE =
√√√√ 1
T
T∑
t=1
(
Iˆsimt − Iobst
)2
(6)
where t = 1, T correspond to Jan 2013 and Dec 2015 respectively. We compare simulations results for
τR = 12 and the values of τd on both of on-road and euclidean based networks that have the lowest AIC
on the training dataset. As we mentioned before, the model with best AIC might not coincide with the
one with best prediction results. However, it is not feasible to implement Monte Carlo simulation for all
possible models, thus we make this choice in selecting what model to consider for measuring prediction’s
performance. We then compare performance with the case with no epidemic, i.e. α = 0. We did not run
Monte Carlo realizations for neighborhood n = 14 because the inferred epidemic component was null,
and so there is no difference between the two models. Notice that the full joint dynamics of the entire
system during the test period is not deterministic, therefore we need to consider Monte Carlo simulations
starting all from the same initial conditions to estimate its stochastic behavior. In Tab. 5.3 we can see
that for all neighborhoods, the RMSE for the model with an epidemic component is lower than the one
for the model with no epidemic, although in some cases the difference is so small that it is insignificant
(n ∈ {7, 8, 9, 16}). For these neighborhoods, the final time step activation ratio IˆsimT for the epidemic
model is within a standard deviation from the one with no epidemic, indicating that the two models do
not show a significant difference in their predictions of the number of participating houses 36 months
after the end of the training set.
Comparing the temporal dynamics with the results of the inference approach we can argue that
for neighborhoods n ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 13, 15} the epidemic model is preferred by both approaches, thus
providing a strong evidence that the presence of peer effect in the model helps represent WSL adoption
dynamics. For neighborhoods n ∈ {8, 9, 14} the evidence is against the presence of peer effect because
both methodologies give negative results. For the remaining neighborhoods n ∈ {1, 6, 7, 11, 12, 16}, the
evidence is less clear because one of the two approaches shows a performance improvement for the model
including epidemic effects, while the other does not.
The participation ratio predicted at the final time step in Dec 2015 is in general overestimated by
both models, indicating the presence of a slow down in adoption dynamics. This could be caused by
structural constraints which limit program uptake and are not explicitly observed in our dataset but it
is hard to speculate about their precise nature in the absence of further evidence.
6 Conclusions
In this work we study neighborhood based peer effects around participation in Las Vegas, Nevada’s water
conservation program, Water Smart Landscapes. Using a discrete-time mechanistic epidemic model on
different network topologies we find evidence of peer effects in several of the randomly selected neighbor-
hoods considered in this study. This indicates that the presence of a participating home increases the
likelihood of their neighbors also participating in the program. We provided evidence of this effect using
both an inference and a prediction approach, and find that for several neighborhoods the epidemic model
has both better AIC and better performance in predicting the program’s future adoption. In addition,
we find evidence that there is a recovery period in the influence a household’s WSL conversion has on
neighboring homes. Models where an active house impacts its neighbors’ decisions to participate for
several months to a year are preferred over models where this contagion is indefinite, suggesting that the
peer effect fades in time.
We provided a mapping between a mechanistic and discrete-time epidemic model with autoinfection
and an additive-multiplicative hazard model; this allows us to capture variations in autoinfection prob-
abilities based on covariates on individual houses. In both the inference and prediction approaches, we
carefully control for the main challenges associated with identifying peer effects: reflection, homophily,
and correlated unobservables. The prediction approach is particularly well suited to distinguishing peer
effects from homophily and correlated unobservables, because these types of self sorting or environmen-
tal factors can be expected to change slowly relative to changes in WSL participation: moving between
homes is a significantly larger decision than changing the outdoor landscape in that home. Thus, this
type of epidemic modeling can extend and complement hazards models that have been used in economics
to identify the existence of peer effects.
Applying techniques from epidemic modeling to the analysis of peer effects suggests opportunities to
explore a wide range of problems related to the one studied here by exploiting recent methodological
developments in inference and optimization Altarelli et al. (2014a,b). For instance, these methods could
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Table 5: Prediction results. Within each neighborhood, results are ordered by the root mean square
error (RMSE) (6) over 100 Monte Carlo realizations. In all these tests the recovery time is fixed to
τR = 12 months; τd is the distance threshold used to build the network; IobsT and Iˆ
sim
T are the observed
and predicted final-time participation ratios at the end of the study period T. The standard deviation of
IˆsimT is σIˆsimT .
Neighborhood Distance Metric τd RMSE I¯simT σIˆsimT I
obs
T
1 euclidean 0.3 0.0025 0.0536 0.0002 0.0487
on-road 0.2 0.003 0.0544 0.0002
no peer 0.0032 0.0546 0.0002
2 euclidean 0.3 0.0026 0.1472 0.0003 0.1407
on-road 0.2 0.0049 0.1514 0.0002
no peer 0.0055 0.1523 0.0002
3 euclidean 0.2 0.0058 0.1429 0.0003 0.1316
on-road 0.3 0.0059 0.1429 0.0002
no peer 0.0074 0.1453 0.0002
4 euclidean 0.2 0.0067 0.1454 0.0002 0.1321
on-road 0.3 0.0069 0.1455 0.0003
no peer 0.0077 0.147 0.0002
5 euclidean 0.1 0.0045 0.1122 0.0002 0.1035
on-road 0.1 0.0048 0.1127 0.0002
no peer 0.005 0.1129 0.0002
6 euclidean 0.3 0.0055 0.0832 0.0002 0.0737
on-road 0.2 0.0058 0.0836 0.0002
no peer 0.007 0.0856 0.0003
7 on-road 0.3 0.0034 0.0411 0.0002 0.035
euclidean 0.1 0.0035 0.0412 0.0002
no peer 0.0035 0.041 0.0002
8 on-road 0.1 0.0038 0.0779 0.0005 0.0704
euclidean 0.3 0.0039 0.0781 0.0006
no peer 0.0041 0.0784 0.0005
9 on-road 0.3 0.001 0.0152 0.0001 0.013
euclidean 0.2 0.0011 0.0153 0.0001
no peer 0.0012 0.0154 0.0001
10 euclidean 0.1 0.0078 0.1094 0.0002 0.0953
on-road 0.2 0.008 0.1097 0.0002
no peer 0.0086 0.1106 0.0002
11 on-road 0.1 0.0058 0.1473 0.0004 0.1367
euclidean 0.1 0.0059 0.1477 0.0003
no peer 0.0069 0.1492 0.0003
12 euclidean 0.1 0.0062 0.1217 0.0003 0.1088
on-road 0.3 0.0064 0.122 0.0003
no peer 0.0068 0.1226 0.0003
13 on-road 0.3 0.0039 0.1585 0.0003 0.1484
euclidean 0.1 0.0041 0.1588 0.0003
no peer 0.005 0.1605 0.0003
15 euclidean 0.1 0.0067 0.1468 0.0002 0.1333
on-road 0.1 0.0072 0.1478 0.0002
no peer 0.0075 0.148 0.0002
16 euclidean 0.1 0.003 0.0566 0.0001 0.051
on-road 0.2 0.0031 0.0568 0.0001
no peer 0.0031 0.0567 0.0001
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be used to seek an optimal set of houses to target through a marketing campaign in order to maximize the
spread of WSL adoption. Characteristics of neighborhoods where evidence suggests epidemic spreading
is not occurring could also be studied in order to explore any structural impediments to participation,
information water agencies may find useful for program planning. In this work we focused on a direct
measure of contagion effect by considering program adoption as main observable quantity. It would
be interesting to extend these findings to indirect measures, such as effects of one households WSL
participation on their neighbors water consumption.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Log Likelihood of the Epidemic Model
L(t¯|α, µ) =
∑
i∈V |xTi =S
 T∑
t=1
log(1− µti) +
∑
k∈∂i|tkI<T
(T − tkiI) log(1− α)
+ (7)
+
∑
i∈V |xTi 6=S
 ∑
k∈∂i|tkI<tiE−1
(tiE − τkiI − 1) log(1− α) + log
[
1− (1− µtiEi )(1− α)ni
]
+
tiE−1∑
t=1
log(1− µti)
]
8.2 Mapping Epidemic with Autoinfection to Additive-Multiplicative Hazard
Model
Here we outline how the three models SI, additive-multiplicative and multiplicative hazard, describe the
same quantity of interest, the hazard rate λ(ti|Θ, D). In discrete time, this is the conditional probability
that an event happens at time ti, given it has not yet happened before. In general this quantity can
depend on a set of parameters Θ and the data D. In our case Θ = {α, µ} include the transmission and
autoinfection probabilities of all nodes, whereas D = {tiE}, i.e. the data are the observed exposure times.
In the SEIR model, (1 minus) the hazard rate of a susceptible node i at time t is:
1− λi(t|Θ, D) = (1− α)nti (1− µti) Epidemic model (8)
In discrete time Kalbfleisch and Prentice (2011), the hazard rate in the additive-multiplicative hazard
model Höhle et al. (2005); Höhle (2008) can be written as:
1− λi(t|Θ, D) = (1− α)n
t
i
(
e−λ
t
0
)ex¯i·β¯
Additive-Multiplicative (9)
whereas, in the purely multiplicative model used in Towe and Lawley (2013) we have:
1− λi(t|Θ, D) =
(
e−λ
t
0
)ex¯i·β¯eαnti
Multiplicative (10)
where λt0 is the baseline hazard at time t which represents a global contribution to the probability of
getting infected which is the same for all houses; x¯i is a vector of covariates and β¯ is a vector of parameters
coupling the covariates, in a similar flavor as in linear regression.
Comparing (8) and (9) we obtain the mapping (4).
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Proof
From the definition of hazard rate Kalbfleisch and Prentice (2011) which, in discrete time, is a conditional
probability, we have a relationship connecting the probability f(ti) of an event happening at time ti and
the survival probability S(ti), which is the probability that no event happens before time ti (but it can
happen at exactly ti or later):
λ(t) =
f(t)
S(t)
(11)
Notice that for discrete time S(t) =
∑∞
s=t f(s), thus we can write:
f(t) = S(t)− S(t+ 1) =
∞∑
s=t
f(s)−
∞∑
s=t+1
f(s) = f(t) (12)
Substituting into (11):
λ(t) =
f(t)
S(t)
(13)
= 1− S(t+ 1)
S(t)
(14)
Using the equation valid in general Kalbfleisch and Prentice (2011) relating the survival probability
S(t) with the hazard rate Si(t) = e−
∫ t
0
λi(s) ds, the following relation valid for additive-multiplicative
hazard model as in Scheike and Zhang (2002), where λti = αnti + λ0ex¯i·β¯ with covariates can be derived:
Si(t) = S0(t)
exp(x¯i·β¯) Siepi(t) (15)
where S0(t) represents the baseline survival probability when β¯ = 0 and no epidemic effect is present
(α = 0), whereas Siepi(t) represents the epidemic contribution to the survival probability.
For discrete models we can write:
S0(t) =
t−1∏
s=0
(e−λ
s
0) (16)
Siepi(t) =
t−1∏
s=0
(1− α)nsi (17)
Substituting (16) and (17) into (14), we get:
λti = 1− (e−λ
s
0)exp(x¯i·β¯) (1− α)nti (18)
For the purely Multiplicative hazard model as in Towe and Lawley (2013) where λti = λt0 ex¯i·β¯ eαn
t
i we
cannot separate the baseline and epidemic contribution as above, instead we have:
Si(t) = S0(t)
exp(x¯i·β¯+αnti) (19)
which leads to:
λti = 1− (e−λ
s
0)exp(x¯i·β¯+αn
t
i) (20)
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Table 6: Maximum likelihood inference results for different recovery times τR (in months). τd is the distance threshold used to build
the network, n is the neighborhood’s id; the subscript under the AIC refers to the corresponding value of τR; the third line of every
neighborhood refers to the model with no epidemic (τd = 0.0 and α = 0).
n τR = 1 τR = 4 τR = 6 τR = 12 τR =∞ AIC1 AIC4 AIC6 AIC12 AIC∞ dist
1 0.00071 0.0 0.00011 0.00008∗ 7e-06 2860 2867 2863 2855 2880 euclidean
1 0.00024 0.0002 0.0 0.0 0.0 2830 2866 2867 2867 2867 on-road
1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2865 2865 2865 2865 2865
2 0.00023∗ 0.00020∗∗∗ 0.00018∗∗∗ 0.00012∗∗∗ 5e-06 10829 10807 10792 10786 10833 euclidean
2 0.00039 0.0003∗∗∗ 0.00023∗∗∗ 0.00020∗∗∗ 0.00002 10834 10823 10823 10813 10834 on-road
2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10835 10835 10835 10835 10835
3 0.00015◦ 0.00026∗∗∗ 0.00013∗∗∗ 0.00012∗∗∗ 0.0 10994 10976 10972 10977 11042 euclidean
3 0.00039∗ 0.00035∗∗∗ 0.00032∗∗∗ 0.00021∗∗∗ 9e-06 10989 10977 10970 10967 11042 on-road
3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11040 11040 11040 11040 11040
4 0.00010 0.00023∗∗∗ 0.00020∗∗∗ 0.00010∗∗∗ 0.0 12431 12411 12405 12415 12473 euclidean
4 0.00061∗ 0.00033∗∗∗ 0.00032∗∗∗ 0.00025∗∗∗ 0.0 12426 12411 12400 12412 12473 on-road
4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 12471 12471 12471 12471 12471
5 0.00015 0.00014∗∗ 0.00022∗ 0.00017∗∗ 0.0 8408 8389 8397 8402 8428 euclidean
5 0.00001 0.00024◦ 0.00018◦ 0.00015∗∗ 0.0 8401 8407 8407 8415 8428 on-road
5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8426 8426 8426 8426 8426
6 0.00048 0.00037∗ 0.00022◦ 0.00006∗ 0.00003 5089 5087 5087 5087 5091 euclidean
6 0.00077 0.00036∗ 0.00004 0.0 0.00003 5093 5084 5092 5095 5091 on-road
6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5093 5093 5093 5093 5093
7 0.00020 0.00043∗∗∗ 0.00019∗∗∗ 0.00026∗∗∗ 0.00007∗∗∗ 2253 2236 2238 2221 2255 euclidean
7 0.00035 0.00055∗ 0.00029∗ 0.00027∗∗∗ 0.00012∗∗ 2259 2236 2251 2211 2218 on-road
7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2328 2328 2328 2328 2328
8 0.00001 0.00037 0.00035 0.00016 0.0 835 834 835 835 838 euclidean
8 0.00001 0.00051 0.00028 0.00011 0.0 835 833 834 835 838 on-road
8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 836 836 836 836 836
9 0.0 0.00018 0.00021 6e-06 2e-06 1487 1471 1474 1480 1495 euclidean
9 0.0 0.00023 0.00067◦ 0.00012◦ 0.00008 1487 1460 1470 1463 1460 on-road
9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1485 1485 1485 1485 1485
10 0.00011 0.00044∗∗∗ 0.00035∗∗∗ 0.0003∗∗∗ 0.0 7554 7538 7537 7525 7581 euclidean
10 0.00077∗ 0.00037∗∗ 0.00036∗ 0.00022∗∗∗ 0.0 7548 7546 7551 7552 7581 on-road
10 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7579 7579 7579 7579 7579
11 0.00013 0.00015 0.00014◦ 0.00008◦ 0.0 4053 4054 4052 4053 4073 euclidean
11 0.00026 0.00010 0.00041 0.00034◦ 0.00001 4053 4053 4051 4050 4072 on-road
11 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4071 4071 4071 4071 4071
12 1e-05 0.0001 0.00023 0.00025∗ 0.00005 4565 4568 4572 4553 4566 euclidean
12 0.00024 0.00019 0.00028∗ 0.00027∗∗ 7e-06 4565 4564 4564 4554 4579 on-road
12 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4627 4627 4627 4627 4627
13 0.00160∗∗ 0.00027∗∗∗ 0.00024∗∗∗ 0.00057∗∗∗ 0.00009∗∗ 7620 7615 7604 7607 7663 euclidean
13 0.00091∗∗ 0.00044∗∗ 0.00065∗∗∗ 0.00057∗∗∗ 0.00019∗∗ 7627 7619 7613 7601 7614 on-road
13 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7709 7709 7709 7709 7709
15 0.00025∗ 0.00044∗∗∗ 0.00034∗∗∗ 0.00023∗∗∗ 0.0 13067 13053 13054 13053 13126 euclidean
15 0.00016 0.00049∗ 0.00025∗∗ 0.00017∗∗ 0.00002 13073 13065 13062 13062 13120 on-road
15 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 13124 13124 13124 13124 13124
16 0.00007 0.00016 0.00022∗ 0.00019∗∗ 0.00004∗∗∗ 6031 6037 6024 6020 6140 euclidean
16 0.00011 0.00012 0.00032∗∗ 0.00025∗∗∗ 0.00005 6030 6072 6017 6016 6031 on-road
16 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6105 6105 6105 6105 6105
◦ p < 0.1 ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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